



Securitization of Immigration through Populist rhetoric in Italy by the Brothers of Italy (FdI)

İtalya'da İtalya'nın Kardeşleri (FdI) Tarafından Popülist Retorik Aracılığıyla Göçün Güvenlikleştirilmesi

ABSTRACT

So-called threat of immigration and refugee flow by the various politicians in recent times have become a very prominent tool to rise to political and social power. Through populism political parties and to those who are in the lead started to gain the legitimacy and the votes of the people. Italy through the last couple years experienced this phenomenon. One of the most visible example is the influence of the Fratelli d'Italia and the Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. Pointing immigration on all kinds as a threat to identity and society in general while putting it in a securitization process to make it a source of stable power. This study is a discussion focused on the speech acts of the Fratelli d'Italia and the Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni through news outlets, speeches, quotes and several propagandas stated within programmes while presenting a prominent debate on the securitization of immigration within Italy through populist rhetoric. This research had been conducted through the assumption based on the securitization theory and the populist views of the political party at hand through manifestos, speeches and events that took place in the recent history. These events still continue to have effects in our times.

Keywords: Italy, Populism, Securitization, Immigration, Europe.

ÖZET

Son yıllarda çeşitli politikacılar tarafından göç ve mülteci akışına yönelik sözde tehdit, siyasi ve sosyal güç elde etmek için oldukça belirgin bir araç haline gelmiştir. Popülizm yoluyla, siyasi partiler ve lider konumunda olanlar halkın meşruiyetini ve oylarını kazanmaya başlamış bulunmaktadır. İtalya, son birkaç yılda bu olgunun en görünür örneklerinden birini, Fratelli d'Italia (İtalya'nın Kardeşleri) ve Başbakan Giorgia Meloni'nin etkisiyle yaşamıştır. Göçü her türden bir kimlik ve topluma yönelik tehdit olarak gösterip, bunu güvenlikleştirme sürecine sokarak istikrarlı bir güç kaynağına dönüştürme stratejisi uygulanmıştır. Bu çalışma, Fratelli d'Italia ve İtalya Başbakanı Giorgia Meloni'nin söylem eylemlerine, haber kaynakları, konuşmalar, alıntılar ve programlarda belirtilen çeşitli propagandalar aracılığıyla odaklanmakta ve İtalya'daki göçün popülist retorik yoluyla güvenlikleştirilmesine ilişkin önemli bir tartışma sunmaktadır. Bu araştırma, güvenlikleştirme teorisi ve ele alınan siyasi partinin popülist görüşleri temel alınarak yapılmış; manifestolar, konuşmalar ve yakın tarihli olaylar üzerinden gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu olayların günümüzde de etkilerini sürdürdüğü gözlemlenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İtalya, Popülizm, Güvenlikleştirme, Göç, Avrupa.

INTRODUCTION

The depiction of immigrants as *dangerous others*, "who are together depicted as robbing (or attempting to robbing) the sovereign and native people of their basic rights, values, culture, prosperity, identity, and voice," is one of the defining characteristics of populism, particularly on the right (Bonansinga, 2019). Various researches have demonstrated and pointed that the right-wing populism offers a certain picture of immigration in our current times as a complex threat to native societies. as Accordingly, the immigrants are frequently accused of threatening the survival of regional customs and traditions, as well as of driving down wages, stealing jobs, engage in crime, disrupt the order and taxing the welfare system (Lazaridis & Skleparis, 2016).

Securitization and populism through certain processes might be eligible support each other over a rhetoric. This paper aims to explain and bring a better understanding of how Italy securitized the immigration through a populist rhetoric with the Fratelli d'Italia's influence. Most crucial aspect of securitization on immigration is the existence of perceived threat by a securitizing actor. However, to make this perception, it requires a certain process. Through effective populist rhetoric, the audience are manipulated to believe that the immigration is a threat to the country.

With substantial ramifications for both EU integration and domestic politics in the Member States, the unprecedented wave of migration that has affecting the Europe since 2015 has put national and European institutions under intense strain. An analysis of the immigration crisis' effects on elites' and political parties' stances on the subject is based on Italy, one of the main entry ports for immigrants entering the Europe from the Mediterranean Sea (Di Mauro & Verzichelli, 2019). Thus, this paper's main concern is to focus on a specific political party within Italy and deconstruct its populist rhetoric on immigration and observe the securitization process in correlation. Fratelli d'Italia (FdI) or in English, The Brothers of Italy and Giorgia Meloni, the current Prime Minister of Italy are considered as the centre of this study.

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Initially, Italian governments have responded to EU-level policies on immigration by taking several actions and calling for shared crisis management. Radical right political entrepreneurs, actors, parties and the solidarity movement have fought over how to handle migrants in transit and how to define the humanitarian emergency in the public eye (Castelli Gattinara, 2017). However, these responses and definitions by actors started to lead to a certain way of campaigning to gather the support of the Italian people. With the lead of Giorgia Meloni and the FdI's populist rhetoric towards immigration, her political right-wing party became the prominent power. Thus, accordingly to this research's observations, immigration started to be securitized within Italy.

This paper's claims will be based upon the reactions and claims of the FdI and the Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni towards the immigration while reflecting their views over the Italian people to gather power. General claim is that the use of the agency of fear through populism causes the population of a certain country to turn in to the extreme reactions or actors (securitizing actors' process of securitization) thus securitizing the event at hand.

SECURITIZATION: A NEW FRAMEWORK

For the last few decades, the Copenhagen School of security studies brought the field of theoretical research a new approach. With various constructs of security over the migration-security nexus this theory affected many studies and ideas (Stępką, 2022). The Copenhagen School's securitization theory became a new approach towards the understanding of security and its connection to the referent objects (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). Understanding the connection of security and audience plays a critical role for this paper. Moreover, analysing certain tools for constructed security nexus over immigration through populist rhetoric is also an aspect studied in this research.

Nonetheless, what is securitization? Securitization starts with targeting a certain threat and via speech acts that threat becomes something extreme or extraordinary by a securitizing actor (Buzan et al., 1998). The emphasis on the securitizing actors sits on a crucial aspect within this study because they meld this securitization process over the aimed threats. Moreover, it can be argued that securitization gets in motion through a certain process with various components (Balzacq et al., 2016). These components have various effects on the process to make a threat more than what it already is to gain what the securitizing actor or actors have in mind (Stritzel, 2014). The components of this process in a line can be first, the threat which is the topic that had been presented to the populace to be transformed as a national security issue or something extreme to gain benefit from (Balzacq, 2005). Later on the speech act is the language and the techniques to bend the words to present the threat in a suitable way for the securitization process' aims by the actor (Taureck, 2006). Third one is the securitizing actor a person or persons who are the architects of the process, they can be political actors, parties or even various organisation as well (Floyd, 2021). Fourth is one of the most important one which is the audience. It is where the securitizing actors drives and gets their power and legitimacy for their actions. The audience is basically the people or the population of a country (Leonard & Kaunert, 2010). In this research, this audience is the people of Italy who elected the FdI and allows most of the actions of the FdI towards the immigration throughout this securitization process. As the fifth, comes the referent object. This component is the very element that needs to be secured and defended against the selected threat (Eroukhmanoff, 2017). The culture and identity focus within this study over the Italy towards immigration is the given referent object. Number six is the facilitating conditions; these components of the process are factoring those effects how the speech act is received by the audience in general (Šulović, 2010, pp. 1-7). Lastly, there is the intended outcome, this component is the desired outcome at the end of the process by the securitizing actors. Accordingly, to the author's views in this paper connecting certain dots for the framework of securitization was need through the broad explanations.

Furthermore, the specifics of this research from now on connects to the populism which presents how the speech act, and the facilitating outcomes can be so important and can be utilized in such swift actions towards the audience. Following the process through the populism makes the immigration much easier to be received as a threat overall.

POPULISM: GOING OVER THE BASICS

Something that has become more than a cliché in any literary endeavour involving populism is mentioning the elusiveness of its definition- a cliché that must unfortunately be repeated here. Despite its age as a stand-alone academic field of study and the decades of actively developing tools to identify and measure, populism has impressively managed to evade a definition that is unanimously backed. Part of the fog surrounding populism is created by wide, reckless and inconsistent usage of the term that are laden with pejorative and reactionary meaning, routinely depicting populism as a fatal political development, synonymous with authoritarianism or dictatorship (Caiani & Graziano, 2016). The reckless usage of the term 'populist' in ways, none of which is new. Populism has long suffered from a Cinderella complex as asserted by Isaiah Berlin (1967), where populist scholars focus on conceptions of populism that 'nearly fit' the shoe of 'true populism something that needs to be avoided (Berlin et al., 1968).

In contemporary contexts, populism is commonly described as being anti-pluralistic, illiberal and largely associated with emotional, simplistic, and manipulative discourse aimed at the people's gut feelings with an innate aversion to the ideas of representation, a represents one of the two overarching debates on the effects of populism (Béland, 2017). This is that populism stands as an illiberal threat to liberal democracies while the other is that populism serves to rejuvenate the liberal and democratic order by expanding the scope of inclusivity by granting a voice to the previously excluded or underrepresented thus acting as a democratic corrective (Mouffe, 2018, pp. 2-24).

Populism's Cinderella complex has also manifested theoretically with populism being conceptualized as either an ideology, political rhetoric, communication style or an organizational model (2016). Although there is a lack of a unified working definition there is widespread agreement on populism falling short of having a coherent ideological framework that it would require to operate as a holistic theory like Marxism or Communism making it a thin ideology (Mudde, 2017). Due to this perceived transience populism has gained a considerable reputation for its seemingly inherent 'chameleonic nature', allowing it to contort itself fix into various contexts while better complimenting full ideologies (Aslanidis, 2015).

The numerous frictions and pitfalls that plague populist scholars are intensified when focus is shifted to reviewing sensation within the Italian peninsula. Dubbed as Europe's 'populist paradise', populism's presence in Italy is both widespread and entrenched, even cited as 'having a near monopoly on what populism represents in Western Europe, becoming the location *par excellence* of populism's triumph over traditional parties (Tarchi, 2015). Some who have made efforts to situate populism within Italy's specific history have found that populism's emergence and growth took place largely through discursive framing used to construct 'the people building on the themes inherited from its fascist past including distrust in political parties, desire for an organic reshaping of society beyond ideology, and faith in personal virtues of individual leaders (Maccaferri, 2022, pp. 5-17). This framing was exemplified by Silvio Berlusconi, who displayed a communication style founded on the simplification of arguments that embodies the primacy of public aspirations over institutional constraints, the superiority of a healthy society and a well-managed economy and the right of the citizen individual to give a specific mandate to the representative of his choosing (2022). Evidence revealing the prominence of populism as a discursive stylistic form would, under different circumstances, lead us to conceptualize populism as a political strategy' however it seems prudent to approach populism as a blend of ideology, political strategy, discursive style and organization in an effort to avoid becoming too concerned with defining populism and less bothered with how populism used it, in combination with securitization, to secure victory in the 2022 Italian national election (Bar, 2018, pp. 44-56).

That being said, most scholars and their proposed theories find common ground on what Roberto Biorcio labels *the populist model*, the collective of the core elements that are used to identify and operationalise populist behaviour (Biorcio, 1991). Overall populism refers to a *monolithic people*, contraposing them to those who are not the people, a grouping often made up of political, intellectual, or economic elites or individuals said to be self-serving and advocating for the 'foreign' ideologies (Ruzza & Fella, 2011). The contraposition is grounded in anti-elite Manichean discourse, pitting 'the people' against 'the elites', while a simultaneous appeal to the authentic general will of the people is made (Woods & Wejnert, 2014). Notably, this general will cannot be rationally expressed (through the existing rules and procedures of formal democracy) and thus is generally intuited and or articulated by a charismatic leader who identifies themselves both as an enemy of the ruling elites and as one of the people by the people themselves (2014). In this rhetoric what is vital is the importance of the moralistic narrative of a heroic 'pure' people with a leader committed to protecting them, struggling against a 'corrupted' elitist blight and their unjust hegemony (Kurylo, 2022). Second, is the rejection of parliamentary democracy's kind of political representation in favour of direct democracy and a system that stresses the importance of strong leadership. Here populism is constituted by a bond between "the supremacy of the will of the people and the direct relation between them and the leadership"(2022). That populism can be seen as opposition to the existing political order through a relatively dangerous oversimplification of the political sphere (2022).

The relationship between European manifestations of populism and populism cannot be under-emphasised, as immigration forms a considerable part of populism expression, particularly among the populist right wing. Part of the focus on immigration is, in a way, a by-product of the populist Right's nativism and 'harder' variants of Euroscepticism which then takes on an 'anti-immigration' appearance galvanised by slogans like 'Europe for Europeans' (Condruz-Băcescu, 2014, pp. 52-58).

What makes immigration a signature issue for Right-wing populist parties are the numerous economic, cultural identity, social and security insecurities and anxieties anchored to it, anxieties when combined make like placed on the native states by instigated by globalization and immigration.

Populism itself is a form of identity politics, one being used to reconstruct the European identity away from post-war World War II internationalist values typically associated with Europe and towards exclusionary cultural racism that the Right-wing adopted after the biological racism became an unusable narrative in most of Europe (Zaslave, 2004). Through the application of democratic tolerance and cultural equality, the Right assert that all people have the natural right to safeguard their own cultures, this inherent right is magnified for dominant European cultures against the invasion of non-European cultures.

Mainly attributed to the migration crisis that began in 2015 and brought with it the administrative shock that overwhelmed the migration processes installed by the EU and member states. Despite the number of irregular migrants entering Europe has witnessed a significant decline since the start of the crisis, Europe has been dealing with the stain left behind- the feeling that European governments had little control over the situation. This combined with a latent scepticism towards the ‘integrability’ of so many newcomers into European societies that has been activated by a narrative of an erosion of European culture.

It may seem like there is a direct relationship between immigration and the increase in right-wing populism, is a lot less a direct consequence of the increase in immigration and more a result in a blend of administrative difficulties in handling the spike in immigration, media attention towards the migration issue that sparked dominant scepticism towards migration in some groups of the population which in turn has been manipulated.

RISE OF THE BROTHERS OF ITALY (FRATELLI D'ITALIA, FDI)

Fratelli d'Italia (FdI) or in English, Brothers of Italy is a newcomer right wing party which started as a splinter move in 2012 to the general elections victory of theirs in 2022 as the most voted political party with Giorgia Meloni as the leader (Baldini et al, 2022). The rise of right-wing conservatism and this newly formed party to the peaks of political power within Italy in such a short notice ties to various recent world changing events. However, before that the party's origins must be observed to understand the causality between these events and the numbers of immigrants coming towards Italy specifically by sea in 2015 since the sea route of migrants and refugees had been one of the main routes to enter the country and caused many crises as a result (McMahon & Sigona, 2021). Below you can find the related graphic.




Figure 1: Immigrant Arrivals by Sea, based on the figures provided by Statista.

Source: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/623514/migrant-arrivals-to-italy/>

In continuation to the topic, FdI separated from the major centre right political party of the People of Freedom (Popolo della Libertà, PdL) as a splinter group caused by certain ideological and leadership problems (Roberts, 2022). December 16, 2012, Rome, turning of events started to happen which formed a new dawn for the right wing in Italy. Giorgia Meloni, Fabio Rampelli, Guido Crosetto, and Giuseppe Cossiga pushed their agendas which resulting in directly denounced the administration of Silvio Berlusconi and opposing to the idea of forming an electoral coalition with the Prime Minister Mario Monti. Furthermore, When Berlusconi declared that in December 2012, he would be the head the PdL again without holding the competitive primaries to choose the prime minister candidate as he had promised months earlier, the opposition divided greatly, and separation of the party started at that point. Aiming for the general elections of Italy in February 2013, Giorgia Meloni, one of the primary candidates, and certain other members saw their openings and made the decision to quit the PdL to create a new political party on December 21, 2012. Meloni thus rose to become the newly found party of FdI's leader (Donà, 2022).

Thus, the ideological and political shift of Italian right had begun. Overall, Giorgia Meloni's aim was of building a 'patriot movement' and the party has its programme 'fine-tuned', with the FdI presenting itself as a national conservation and a sovereign party, complete with the right-wing slogan 'in defence of God, Fatherland,

Family' (Sondel-Cedarmas & Berti, 2022). Related with that, Meloni continued to show and support on her claims to the people by saying: "*But we aren't just codes. We are people. And we'll defend our identity*" (Alessandra, 2022).

Regarding these types of attributes connected to the identity of a community or a nation in international relations identities plays a crucial role. The securitizing actors connects security and identity or belonging to gain their needs while transfigures others on the basis of negativity (Browning & Joenniemi, 2017).

Shifting its central aim from the defence of national boards through the restoration of the sense of national belonging and national pride among Italians, this intentional behaviour is the only antidote against the dual threat of cultural degradation and the 'Islamification' process supposedly initiated by mass immigration (Hedges, 2015, pp. 589-606).

As for another vital programme point in the FdI is the aim of rebuilding state authority, one with a strong executive branch. In line with this is the importance placed on ensuring security and order in the state, pushing for reinforcing of police numbers, installation of legal frameworks that would punish anti-police attacks and a 2018 proposal to essentially legalize torture in the case of policy, arguing that it limited the ability of security forces from adequately doing their job (2015).

These populist actions towards far-right secured the rise of FdI rather exponentially which allowed party to spread its roots deeper within the Italy's political area. As it can be seen between 2018 and 2022 general election results of Italy, in 2018 FdI only had the 4.4% of the votes from the people but in 2022 it can be seen FdI rose to the top with 26.0% of votes thus Italy elects the far-right coalition (Coi, 2022).

However, there are even more certain reasons why the FdI rose to power so quickly and holds the most votes right now. This study focuses on the example case of how the securitization of immigration had been utilized with the populist rhetoric which in general helped FdI to gain greater support within the country.

As a start, the Italian political debate on the issue of migrants and refugees who have entered Italy, the topic of immigration overflow is very divisive within the Italian politics and its media. These reflections make a certain stance within the politics and over the people by the securitizing actors because populist and security themes tend to gather support and power. Therefore, FdI's electoral programme promises pointed towards certain subjects related to this research's interests such as directly quoting, "*Stopping illegal immigration and restoring security to citizens*". The emphasis of security rises some eyebrows which some might suggest FdI perceives immigration as a straight security issue for Italy and its people.

Overall, in this area of politics of Italy, the increasing securitization of migration and neoliberal globalisation have both been linked to bordering as a *tactic of reaction* against people's movement. On the one hand, it is a component of the growing worldwide securitization of border controls as a result of the way migration is portrayed as a threat to national identity and welfare protections as well as a social (crime) and political (terrorist) hazard (Montagna, 2023).

Furthermore, because of its location as one of the most accessible doorways to Europe especially through the Mediterranean Route, Italy attracted a considerable number of migrants. Massive migrant waves that arrived at its beaches presented several new difficulties for the nation, including those pertaining to the creation of security procedures for the securitization of migration. In this context, it's critical to comprehend the level to which immigrants are viewed as a threat to society and, thus, as an issue that has to be secured (Securitization of Migration in Italy, 2023). However, as a comparison the rise of FdI while using immigration there are also additional components effected their policies, first, pandemic caused by the COVID-19 virus with the shutting of borders diminished the migration flow but did not stop the issue, second invasion of Ukraine by Russia caused another migration wave towards European border but the result of this wave proved that the existence of double standards of taken policies towards African/Middle-Eastern descended migrants (Campisi & Emma Sottillotta, 2022). All these gears fit together for FdI to combine the perfect tools for securitization process through their populist speech acts to draw legitimacy from the audience therefore, power.

Focus on the taken policies and enacted laws put in motion towards the immigration crisis bolsters both the public's opinion toward the FdI and the prime minister through crafted populist rhetoric. To gain the support of the people, immigration became a main spot and a source for attraction. Moreover, even the states with the most strident anti-immigrant rhetoric today do not have a vehement anti-immigrant stance. In reality, states want to choose the immigrants to their nations based on specific standards. Migration waves brought on by coercive conditions are a wholly unacceptable circumstance (ÇITAK, 2020). However, some hides behind these criteria and conditions. Prime minister Giorgia Meloni stressed her support on immigration, she also pointed toward the connection of her country's need connected to solidarity: "*Europe's and Italy's economies need immigrants, but we must only let in those whom our countries are able to take in, because if we cannot take care of them, it is not solidarity.*" (Meloni's Ambiguity on Migration a Challenge for European Security, 2023).

Therefore, as an observation to look between the lines, in this case the decision to take in and to provide the ability to take care the immigrants come down to the choice of preference. Choosing who to offer help while hiding behind the can or cannot brings the discourse of discrimination (Podgórska, 2019). Through this discourse the choice to perceive who is a threat or who is not within the concepts of national security or solidarity leads to further processes of securitization. Used speech act or in this case the populist rhetoric towards illegal immigrants causes the perfect division among Italian people to make them choose for their security. Dividing and categorizing who to help in the help of solidarity and ability pushes the populace (audience) to seek more security from their leaders (securitizing actor).

Furthermore, Italy's securitization process and populist rhetoric has featured on many occasions security and immigration nexus which are present in more recent manifestos presented by FdI, however in increasingly subtler forms so as to allow itself to mimic the kind of measured nationalism displayed by the centre-right that is palatable to the electorate, including those that are left-leaning. Links immigration firstly to terrorism, corruption and criminal activities later mentioning the place of other issues related to illegal immigration like human trafficking.

“Security is the basis of social coexistence and guarantees development and well-being. Between old and new forms of crime, Italy is increasingly insecure. Immigration threatens the safety and quality of citizens. Our cities are degraded and unliveable. Suburbs and historic centres are the scene of illegal occupations, violence and drug dealing”.²

Also features a Cicero misquote “*What cannot be truly honest is not also right*” followed by writing “*Honest and justice are concepts that merge and represent the guiding star that charts the course*”.³ Played a massive role in FdI's electoral strategy, unsurprisingly feeding back into a central feature of populist discourse, this being that the populist actor is an honest representation of the will of the people, and through the distortion of Cicero, alludes to a logic that argues that seeing as FdI is honest about the will of the people, it is also morally right. It does not hurt that mentioning Cicero, whether accurate or not, invokes an image of a proud, vibrant cultural heritage that illegal immigration threatens to erode.

While FdI displays the typical features of the populist Right it has fallen short of labelling itself as populist, which should come as no surprise considering how rare it is for parties or movements that fall within the populist spectrum to identify with a label that has accrued heavy stigmatization.

As seen through the excerpt of FdI's most 2022 electoral manifesto, similar to other members of Italy's Right, FdI and Meloni's anti-immigration discourse has been carefully linked to and carried out through a security narrative. Crucial to this establishing the notion that combating illegal immigration is the holy grail in being able to reclaim and defend ‘Italian’ values and effectively tackling crime and insecurity in Italy and possibly Europe (De Giorgi & Tronconi, 2018). The securitization of immigration as a matter of national security is a long-standing tradition among Italy's Right Wing with statements that join the migration to crime and insecurity used by current coalition partner Silvio Berlusconi and Forza Italia leader, along with Matteo Salvini and Meloni being said to remark that “*uncontrolled migration leads to insecurity, crime and decay*”(Di Carlo, et al, 2018).

Meloni has also shown particular disdain for those associated with Islam or the Middle East as seen in 2017 when rape allegations came up against a gang of young boys, all of them aged under 18. In a statement regarding the crime, Meloni referred to the group of boys as “*a gang of Maghreb worms*” despite only two of the boys coming from the Maghreb region (Balmer, 2017).

Through these discussions and examples, this paper revolved around the understanding of the populist rhetoric and how it aimed the securitization process of FdI on immigration with various speech acts to reflect on the issues presented by the FdI and the prime minister.

CONCLUSION

The re-emergence and rapid expansion of populism in Europe have garnered significant attention with opinions ranging from efforts to explain the factors that lend a hand to the seemingly unstoppable rise of populism to articulations on the possibly permanent impacts the different populist forces may have on political future of Europe's constitutive nations but Europe as a whole. In following the trends in electoral victories won by populist parties in Europe a large portion of energies is directed at the shift of populist parties, particularly those aligned with the Right from the fringes of their respective political systems to becoming major players even going as far as being elected to government. One such party is Italy's *Fratelli d'Italia*, led by long-time Right winger Giorgia Meloni, which

² Fratelli d'Italia 2022 program (Translated). <https://www.fratelli-italia.it/programma/>.

³ Fratelli d'Italia 2022 program (Translated). <https://www.fratelli-italia.it/programma/>.

managed to secure a majority of the votes in the 2022 general elections enabling them the chance to seize government with the added assistance of a Right-wing coalition. All of this serves as a vivid reminder of the electoral challenge exclusionary Right Wing populist rhetoric poses to globalist inclusive speech traditional of Western European politics.

In reviewing what took Meloni's party from a small splinter group party scurrying to make the electoral list in 2013 to the largest party in Italy's majority Right-wing coalition it is evident that what has been a major key in transforming FDI has been the aggressively potent blend of two things; the dominant features of right-exclusionary populism and securitization, a mixture that has become common practice with the populist right and as natural as breathing. Some of the primary features of the populist right are anti-immigration attitudes that are frequently combined with some intensity of Euro-scepticism, which in either form present themselves along with cultural, nativist lines and functionally lead to a call for a Europe that is more European referring to a perceived need of increased cultural authenticity of the various nations that Europe is comprised of and less of the pan-European political identity commonly touted as a means of achieving identity unity.

In the case of FDI, anti-immigration narratives were mainly mounted on the lines of cultural and national security, revolving around the suggestion that the growing inflows of illegal immigration are responsible for crime, deterioration of both urban and historical areas, as well as chief in the destabilization of European society through the erosion of Italian and European culture that if left unchecked would leave Europe open to the cultural invasion thus lead to the securitization of immigration through constructed threat.

In conclusion, Italy's newly emerged right wing and the following securitization process of FdI through populist rhetoric towards immigration to present it as a threat on the population to stay in power brings many new challenges, both to Italy itself and Europe in general. Reflecting on how the immigration is receptive and used as a mere tool for many political actors to rise to power and a great proof of that is the rise of FdI itself since it used populism against immigration to get to the power from mere 4.4% to the top.

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