



DESTRUCTIVE PEACE; ABSENTEEISM OF MUTUAL CIVIC NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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ABSTRACT

The manuscript addresses historical and substantive co-occurring processes and conditions of Bosnian state-building, peace-building, and developmental status quo by exploring civic nationalism and social capital patterns within sociocultural-political and ethno-religious hybrid ideological polarization. Moreover, the paper examines the Western Balkans post-conflict ethnonational and religious orders, arguing that regional geopolitical secessionist rhetoric and failure impede social development and stability, aiming to conceptualize explications. Within the Dayton Peace Accords political system, ethno-religious framework proves to be more consequential than plural civic space and social capital. In a democratic and liberal environment, no one should rule over anyone, but legalism and laws, which the state should enforce and thus guarantee peace and critical human security to all citizens. In the current atmosphere of disunity at various levels of B&H society, including the political issue of affiliation, it does not seem possible to unify the Bosnian nation socio-politically. The historical-ideologically shape of nationalities associates metaphysics to non-Bosnian territories and imposes people's awareness of external homelands. The nation-state is the exclusively political option of the contemporary age. Nationalism has proven to be an adverse ideology, leading to destruction, wars, and discrimination. Nevertheless, not every national project is malignant. Civic nationalism confronts the nation's ethnic-religious model generated on ethnicity, religion, and race. In order to understand the past, build a shared future, and form the decisive social capital, civic, democratic awareness, developing a better quality of life, it is crucial to decrease the behavioral practices of division promoted by dominant ethno-political antagonistic rhetorics.

Keywords: Western Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Peace, Non-violence, Social capital, Civic nationalism, Ethnicity, Religion

1. INTRODUCTION

Nationalism is, as has often been pointed out, the plague of the late twentieth century. However, the name of the plague is anti-nationalism, against the background of processes in the former Yugoslavia. Anthony Smith (1996) was the first to point out that most nationalisms contain ethnic and civic elements, albeit in different proportions, and added a third type of plural nationalism to ethnic and civic nationalism. Smith emphasized that all three conceptions of the nation are in practice closely intertwined and that it is easy to switch from one to the other (Smith, 1996). An ethnic nation, in the ideal type sense, derives a nation (political community) from a dominant ethnos (a cultural community that often assumes the blood relationship of its members). As such, it seeks to eliminate "foreign elements." It can be done by assimilation (merging of minority groups into a majority group), forced relocation of an undesirable population, or, in the most extreme cases, genocide. "The bourgeois nation, also ideally typically speaking, separates the nation from the ethnos by considering as members of the nation all its citizens in possession of citizenship, which is granted" (Smith, 1996). In such a conceived nation, ethnic and religious affiliations are a matter of privacy and do not concern the public sphere, which strictly adheres to ethnic and confessional neutrality rules. The youngest ideal type of nation, the plural one, differs from both predecessors by modeling the nation into a kind of "community of communities." It means that the nation implies more constitutive elements (sub-nations) and generally adheres to the necessity of preserving and promoting cultural diversity. Although the plural model of the nation initially originated as an instrument of analysis of classical immigrant societies such as Canada and Australia, it can also be applied to European plurinational states such as the UK, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland (where constituent language groups are) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H). These European countries are closest to the ideal type of plural nation, but this type of categorization is equally helpful for other countries since they "travel" between ideal types, moving away from one and approaching the other depending on the circumstances.

A nation creates a state, but a state also creates a nation. Belief in the existence of a Yugoslav nation was a critical factor in the process of forming Yugoslavia. However, Yugoslavia did not create a dominant Yugoslav

nation, which is probably one of the main reasons the country eventually fell apart. Of the seventy years it lasted, the Yugoslav state actively created the Yugoslav nation for only about five years, between 1929 and 1934. After 1945, the new, revolutionary authorities rejected integral Yugoslavia even more resolutely than they did (in a sense) also revolutionary) ruling structures after 1918 with Habsburg dualism and other state ideologies that deviated from centralism or political unitarism. "Ethnic, national, and confessional affiliation in the former Yugoslavia countries, presently seven independent states, add to political radicalization. As a form of political power, politicized religions are, psychologically speaking, unconscious non-faith. Due to new national-state theoretical inadequacy (i.e., nationalism as an ideology), religion is used as an instrument of socialization and legitimization of new national-political state subjects. The historical revisionism and the memory of the "evil" developed into a behavioral practice" (Hadžić, 2020). Serbian and Croatian nationalists constructed new collective identities against each other and then concerning neighboring peoples - so that the other is negative, alien, and distant, of course, natural. To be the opposite of what the Yugoslavia was. "These structures are a twenty-year-old nightmare of general destruction and frustration in the new states" (Perica, 2016).

Moreover, Bosniak (Bosnian Muslims; other constituent peoples are Bosnian Croats -Catholics and Bosnian Serbs- Orthodox) ethnopolitics has fallen into the framework of a nationally-constructing religion in forming the identity of "Bosniaks," - the most numerous ethnoreligious group in B&H. These tendencies are strengthened by de-Bosnianizing - Bosniak nationalism, neutralizing B&H as an entire Bosnian nation, mutually with pan-Serbian or pan-Croatian nationalism. It is the momentum for the further sociopolitical division. It additionally affects critical human security and developmental framework. All three communities in the areas controlled by the three armies during the war built almost the status of a state denomination. In contrast, they found themselves in a "minority position" in the other two areas, with most of the population not making a critical distinction between ethnic/national and confessional identity to the present day.

These sociopolitical processes enable political decision-makers to act according to the matrix of the old feudal-imperialist conception. Each community, the territory has its religion, and the individual belongs first to his community and then to the political space. The sacralization of politics and the politicization of religion occurred. Moreover, the process of the sacralization of the nations and the nationalization of the religious communities transpired. „Most importantly, Dayton Peace Accords (1995) became the sacred letter of most political elites, preserving the status quo and lacking qualitative changes, maintaining political-interest structures, and being utterly independent of differences in their proclaimed political-ideological goals” (Hadžić, 2021). A phenomenon of ethnonational politics, conviviality keeps each other alive and complements each other on a symbolic and active level. Although in the form of political enemies, they are necessary to maintain themselves in the political sphere. Finally, the international community's role is clarified, primarily through the institution of the High Representative (OHR), which legitimizes the decision-making model and often actively participates in it.

Research of myths in the former Yugoslavia, especially those concerning Serbian mythologization, pointed out the dimension of political myths. Its (manipulative) essence wants to distort than hide crucial facts from political reality, especially political history. Nevertheless, political myths have a vital role in creating the political basis for designing the basics of the emergence and establishment of a political community. It is because founding myths become such an unavoidable segment of the consciousness of the Constitution of national political order regardless of its size and character. "Myths bridge the collective and individual gap between the individual, the ethnic group, and the political community" (Despotovic, 2019). Moreover, the revisionism of official history, ethnoreligious school curricula reform, cultural and media production, the national literary canon have mostly been completed.

Dayton Peace Accords political system and any distraction are welcome to divert attention from endangering human lives; ethnoreligious framework proves to be more consequential than social capital. The interdisciplinary research of social capital is an analytical tool for explaining how culture, trust, and cooperation between people may function for the general good, economic development, and society. The argument proves by the research that showed a relatively unsatisfactory status in the area of observed dimensions of social capital in B&H. "The decision-makers and creators of socio-economic policies should put in a more significant effort to develop social capital, which has significant potential in the incitement of socio-economic development" (Delic et al., 2017).

Moreover, the social network theory to interethnic relations could help identify the conditions under which minorities could embark in divided, post-war societies like B&H. Finally, the interdisciplinary research of

social capital is an analytical tool for explaining how culture, trust, and cooperation between people may function for the general good, economic development, and society. The argument proves by the research mentioned earlier that showed a relatively unsatisfactory status in the observed dimensions of social capital in B&H. Prior studies on the reconciliation process and inter-ethnic social trust and dialogue were primarily negative. However, the political leaders encourage division. In general, citizens do not feel that B&H is moving forward, and they do not have positive future expectations. Corruption, economy, and political leaders are seen as the major problems in the country. Political leaders (elected and party leaders) are the ones that have the most power in society. According to respondents' opinions, if any positive change occurs in the society, it would have to come from the citizens themselves, especially the youth. However, respondents themselves were not ready to participate in making changes. The majority of them are not willing to engage in any form of social activities except to vote in the elections. Many of them are, however, ready to leave the country. Regarding the sentiments on the war that happened in the 1990s, the attitudes of the major ethnic groups are divided. They have different perceptions of the war, and they look at it from different angles. Different ethnic groups also have different attitudes and expectations when it comes to preconditions for reconciliation. Although many of them believe that reconciliation already took place in BiH, many of them also believe that it will never happen (Prism Research, 2015). The seven-year-long research by the Research Team of the University of Edinburgh, Center for Empirical Research on Religion in Novi Sad, Serbia, and Center for Empirical Research on Religion in B&H, completed in 2021, inaugurated up different social perspectives. Almost all respondents believe that the political leaders of the three constituent peoples encourage religious and ethnic divisions (69%), are mired in corruption (34%), and do not stand up for citizens (27%). Thus, narratives that are conducive to the development of a pluralistic civil society and not so visible in the media and public political communication are some of the conclusions (Soldo, 2021).

The paradox of Bosnian identity is noticeable, where the discrepancy between territorial Bosnianness and national non-Bosnianness is visible. B&H is a fascinating, almost unique example of the discrepancy between national genesis and the historical situation. In the process of nation-building, many complex societies must resolve internal tensions and differences, and from this often arise problems of human rights, treatment of minorities, territorial integrity, unresolved issues of affiliation. Regardless of the myths of ancient existence, nations are not "natural" creations but are created in specific political contexts and through the ideology of uniting some, but not all, members of society. That is why they are often said to be "imaginary communities." In the case of B&H, its inhabitants had no ideological and political unification because their differences were treated as a negative consequence of historical trends and, as such, internally unsolvable. Although B&H has remained geographically/territorially almost unchanged throughout history, its population is fragmented through three national nomenclatures. Under the influence of divisional plans from Serbia and Croatia, the territory of B&H was depoliticized and left as a regional reference, not a national creation. Thus we have B&H as a territorial unit, but we do not have Bosnians as a national group, although in an everyday language, people identify as Bosnians in terms of belonging to a typical cultural climate and customs. It is probably the only case in modern history where the ethnic-territorial link between society and the country in which he lives is broken. We have reverse examples everywhere, i.e., formation and self-determination of the nation, but non-recognition of its anchoring in space, as in the case of the Kurds, Palestinians, Uighurs.

2. METHOD

Both general scientific (method of deduction, analysis, and synthesis) and specific scientific methods (comparative and legal) were used in the study. In addition, the study included an in-depth theoretical literature review and examination of a range of other sources such as primary documents relating to "community relations" and dealing with division reports (grey literature) from international and media accounts that would have been otherwise difficult to access. The interdisciplinary nature of the study and understanding helps us avoid several traps (contextual factors such as ancestry/descent, history, institutional background, social norms) when examining identities in contexts such as Western Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In particular, descent-based attributes are difficult to change over a brief period in post-conflict divided societies like the Balkans, i.e., former Yugoslavia.

3. CIVIC NATIONALISM

The nation is the third, highest ethnic-social group built, organized, and the legally regulated community, formed from the transformation of peoples into such a global social and ethnic group, which at a higher level unites its historical, political, economic, cultural interests. The exclusive notion in this atmosphere is that some do not participate in destructive long-term policies and become "traitors-critics" of such designed national and

religious ideologies. Therefore, true tolerance is possible only towards those who recognize the right of free thought and action as a universal right of all community members. Although the plural model of the nation initially originated as an instrument of analysis of classical immigrant societies such as Canada and Australia, it can also be applied to European plurinational states such as the UK, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland (where constituent language groups are) and B&H. These European countries are closest to the ideal type of plural nation. However, this type of categorization is equally helpful for other countries since they "travel" between ideal types, moving away from one and approaching the other depending on the circumstances.

In the initial phase, language and religion were in the first place as collective criteria of affiliation. Religious and linguistic differences were sharply expressed (between Christians and Muslims, on the one hand, or Greek, South Slavic, and Albanian dialects, on the other), determining affiliation could (at first glance) seem relatively unproblematic. The deceptive analytical scholasticism of populist interpreters of religion and the failed communist ideologue of the 21st century testifies to a lack of visions, ideas, and common sense. Serious nations deal with implementing the latest knowledge and technologies in the contents of human life and the emergence of possible implications of this enterprise on moral rationality and its interpretations, aware that scientific and technological progress is not necessarily human progress and does not necessarily achieve humanistic ideals. "When nation and religion become controversial identification and mark others as potentially dangerous, through a policy that allegedly aims to affirm and protect its people and their faith, then in local historical and current circumstances, it essentially implies antagonism in the most dramatic conflicts" (Hadžić, 2020).

B&H is home to the world's most complex Constitution and public administration (Dayton Peace Agreement), based on "ethnoreligious principles" in the form of religious exclusivism. The Constitution defines Bosniak -Croat-Serbs as a constituent of people. In B&H's ethno-religious model, the demographic remnant is unconstitutional. A mere constitutional decor appropriately enshrines in the last article of the Preamble of the B&H Constitution. Those who do not belong to one of the three religious groups or do not want to show affiliation ("the Others") consider a foreign element, prohibited from running for office at any state level. In B&H, as the most complex multiethnic discourse of the former Yugoslavia, pluralism is challenging to achieve due to society's insufficient efforts to make a step towards reconciliation ethnopolitics playing a significant role. It has more than a great impact on society and social processes. B&H is home to the world's most complex Constitution and public administration (Dayton Peace Agreement), based on "ethnoreligious principles" in the form of religious exclusivism. The Constitution defines Bosniak -Croat-Serbs as a constituent of people. In B&H's ethno-religious model, the demographic remnant is unconstitutional. A mere constitutional decor appropriately enshrines in the last article of the Preamble of the B&H Constitution. Those who do not belong to one of the three religious groups or do not want to show affiliation ("the Others") consider a foreign element, prohibited from running for office at any state level (Hadžić, 2020). However, within any political-legal order from the aspect of civil rights, every individual, who is a member of a particular political-legal community or state, should have inalienable rights.

The B&H Constitution obstructs the creation of a plural civic identity, hypostasizes the collective political mentality, and stigmatizes atheism and agnosticism in everyday life. Spiritual usurpation has moved into the realm of identity. "The ideological ethnonationalism has metastasized into a social organization's daily political discourse that produces uncritical subjects in all three constitutive ethnic governments" (Hadžić, 2021). Unlike the socialist system of relations between the state and religious communities, which was first marked by ideologically forced and coercive atheism and then rigid secularism, there are now many examples of clericalism and the privileged position of dominant religious communities. Politicians, and political parties, have always sought to gain legitimacy. It has often been shown - and it seems so today - that this legitimacy is given through the denomination's support.

Civic nationalism is liberal, libertarian patriotism that is not based on xenophobia and intolerance. Patriotic ideas are woven into it, with the freedom and equality of other peoples and respect for their human rights. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, is based on community, narrow ethnicity, and exclusivity towards other peoples. The process performs and levels some countries like B&H. Even to the most superficial observers, it should be transparent that the Dayton Peace Accords had frozen the war conflict, not resolving substantial issues, compensating war crimes, and leaving the policies and ethnic parties that led to the war.

Nevertheless, it continues to lead political life in B&H and the immobility of Bosnian society. As some call tiny Yugoslavia, Bosnian society, regarding its multiculturalism paradigm, many hoped that plural civic space would emerge, even though the entire Middle Ages were spent on alchemy without any visible results. Society and the state, which in this way, in the Dayton Agreement, are deeply unjustly organized and exclusively

according to the ethnonational (ethnoreligious) key, cannot develop in any other way than in the direction of further strengthening of injustice, nationalism, and radical populism. The fatality of this genus of state-building nationalism is that it does not perceive it as nationalism, but as something completely normal, rational, and expected, and then either sincerely wonders or, over time, begins to actively hate all those who do not share the enthusiasm for state symbols and traditional Balkan myths.

The fear of civic nationalism, almost like Marxism, by ethnopolitics in former Yugoslavia, particularly B&H, and the administration of the thesis about the importance of exclusively ethnic-religious identity, prevent any idea of establishing B&H a civic state of different peoples and cultures. Nevertheless, the nation is ethnically, historically, politically, culturally aware, awakened, sober people imbued with an awareness of shared belonging and wholeness.

The war against B&H, which ended with the legalization of the consequences of great-power policies of territorially diverging nationalisms and violent ethnicization of space, makes dependence on chance and violence in three decades of peace a more certain nature its Constitution. B&H is the most critical former Yugoslavia multiethnic discourse (some call it a "small" Yugoslavia). The Dayton Peace Agreement, "legitimized" by the international community, is unjust and senseless, as it was, the war, as an armed territorial-expansionist attack internationally recognized country, although late and with incredible difficulty. Practically, that means that, with that interruption, war tasks, ideologies, and contractors of the war remained unfinished. Framed by the Frame of proven joint criminal enterprise and their effects, B&H is living the agony of real politics. All that remains is the "art" of getting used to the new state, persistence in "accepting the truth." The policy of Bosnian Serbs and Croats patronized by Serbia and Croatia brings B&H with the strategic intention of the status of a dysfunctional state, impossible to live in diversity.

The fact is that through intensive geopolitical and religious interventions throughout its history, from the beginning of the 20th century, B&H is under pressure from the neighboring Serbian or Croatian national ideas. Let us recall Radovan Karadzic's words before the Bosnian War: "Do not think that you will not take B&H to hell and the Muslim people to extinction" (Detsche Welle, 2010). Furthermore, as a reminder, the Dayton Peace Agreement, "legitimized" by the international community, is unjust and senseless, as it was, the war, as an armed territorial-expansionist attack internationally recognized country, although late and with incredible difficulty. Practically, that means that, with that interruption, war tasks, ideologies, and contractors of the war remained unfinished. Since entering the EU, Croatia has turned its B&H policy into the misrepresentation of enlargement policy. „It is because it provides the enlargement skeptics within the EU with excellent arguments, and this is an affront for all who lobbied for Croatia's entry into the EU against those same skeptics. Because of Croatia's unresolved relationship with the recent past, Croatian policy, from the far right to the left, while officially performing as the defender of the interests of B&H Croats, remains trapped in the role of the extended arm and spokesperson of Dragan Čović¹ and HDZ B&H², to the considerable detriment of the Croatian people in B&H, Croatia's reputation within the EU, i.e., in the European Parliament, and in the Council of the EU, where the Croatian representatives are disruptive elements. Croatian government representatives, for example, through years of Council negotiations on conclusions on B&H, request the formulation, "equality of constituent people" to be included, and "equality of citizens," one of the foundations of the *acquis*, to be removed. Bosnian Croat representatives perform more or less secessionist narratives about a third entity" (Democratization Policy, 2021). Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, most engaged in secessionist rhetorics, and politician on long-term black-list of US State Department, stated in 2021 that "ethnic Serbs favor abolishing the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in B&H and holding a referendum on the status of the country's predominantly Serbian entity if their views are not respected" (Radio Free Europe, 2021). Milorad Dodik (2021) pointed out that German politician Christian Schmidt, the New B&H High Representative appointed in October 2021, falsely presents himself as the High Representative because he is not. "What Schmidt promotes here as his agenda is not within the competence of the High Representative, which shows that one should only have increased suspicion and non-acceptance of such a character. I see that Christian Schmidt is wasting some optimism and trying to impose an agenda that only he has about himself. What Schmidt announced was not the role of the High Representative in B&H in the past either" (N1, 2021).

If the "pan-Serbian" identity thesis from Serbia has been convincing people for a century that they are a Serb and have Turks and Muslims as enemies. Alternatively, because they freed themselves from "600 years of

¹ Bosnian Croat politician and President of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) party since 2005. He is a current member of the national House of Peoples.

² The Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine* or HDZ BiH) is a Christian democratic, nationalist political party in Bosnia and Herzegovina representing the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Turkish slavery," it is not easy to expect the Bosnian Orthodox to remain loyal to the country and, so abruptly Serbized by a very conflicting identity such as the pan-Serb one, does not come into conflict with his neighbor and, ultimately, with himself and his Bosnian history. The relationship of party politics of remembrance with fascist elements will demystify much more far-reaching consequences for the democratic process and the Constitution of a political community where ethnic nationalism is at its peak. Moreover, political myths in the former Yugoslavia, especially those concerning Serbian political mythologization (e.g., the Kosovo myth), pointed out its (manipulative) essence, creating the political basis for designing the basics of the emergence and establishment of a political community. The Kosovo myth or Kosovo cult is one of the critical Serbian political myths, forming the basis of Serbian national identity and the atomic core of Serbian nationalism. It has inspired many artists, poets, and thinkers for centuries and is essential to Serbia's cultural heritage. The Serbian Orthodox Church particularly nurtures it. However, its role in politics is fatal because it nurtures irrational notions of racial specificity, promotes reconciliation with fate and fatalism, advocates the necessity of sacrifice by promising a "kingdom of heaven," and favors death over life to save the soul of the homeland (Trgovcevic, 1996).

When it comes to the envisaged infinity of B&H, citizens' views were in collision in 2015. Bosniaks would like to live in a unified country without entities and cantons. Many Croats would like to have their entity. Serbs would like to live in an independent Republic of Srpska (RS). However, only a tiny number would be ready to take up arms or participate in violent protests. Future scenarios that are preferable for the FB&H entity (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) is to abolish cantons and for the RS to be an independent country. However, respondents do not believe that anything will change regarding the organizational structure of the country (Prism Research, 2015).

Through the integrative force of normative consensus, civil associations educate values and strengthen the value system and civic virtues such as tolerance, mutual respect, honesty, reliability and trust, and civic courage. Social capital is accumulated through normative consensus. For Tocqueville, civil society associations are primarily "schools for democracy," in which democratic (communitarian) thought and civic behavior are ritualized and habilitated through everyday symbolic practice. For civil associations to be or become a space for communicative action and "self-government," they must not be too large, but they must be numerous. "These associations need to be institutionalized at all levels of the political system because when those at the local level lag behind in democratic (civil) development, then democracy, freedoms, and human rights at the global level are also perverted" (Arta, 2008). From Alexis de Tocqueville's perspective, civil society makes a normative and participatory potential available to democracy, which immunizes freedom against the authoritarian temptations of the state and sets the tyrannical ambitions of political power elites within their internal limits. In the Tocqueville tradition, "the affirmative functions of civil society for the overall democratically constituted community - that is, the state and society - are highlighted and associated with a very pronounced participatory component of self-government" (Tocqueville, 2000). Furthermore, we can problematize that civil society can act directly to solve critical problems, allowing individuals to participate and collaborate. Thus, they develop into citizens capable of sustaining democracy. The 2015 research revealed citizens' passive attitude towards the change. The primary reason behind this passive attitude is that citizens do not believe that they can change anything. Together with the passivity of politicians, the passive attitude of citizens may be one of the reasons for the country's stagnation. At the same time, for many citizens, their ethnicity is more important than their national identity (Prism Research, 2015). Therefore, it is challenging to create an atmosphere of togetherness in such conditions, achieve co-existence and prevent future conflicts. However, politicians who have the least trust of citizens regarding reconciliation provoke mutual hatred in everyday rhetoric affecting the plural civic space. Moreover, according to the study by the Research Team of the University of Edinburgh, Center for Empirical Research on Religion in Novi Sad, Serbia, and Center for Empirical Research on Religion in B&H, there is also a fundamental problem of corruption. „It has captured the system's institutions, thus losing both trust and freedom of action. Nevertheless, the results of these reports have shown support for reconciliation processes, with significantly different biases and rhetorics than those that dominate public discourse in B&H" (Soldo, 2021).

In the historical circumstances of the violent dissolution of the common Yugoslav state, the B&H society did not have the opportunity for a peaceful transition and democratic constitutionalization. The war against B&H, which ended with the legalization of the consequences of great-power policies of territorially diverging nationalisms and violent ethnicization of space, makes dependence on chance and violence in three decades of peace a more certain nature its Constitution. Being the most critical multiethnic discourse of socialist Yugoslavia (some call it a "small" Yugoslavia), in essence, B&H's multiculturalism is a very controversial and

complex concept, both in discussions within B&H and globally. The Dayton Peace Agreement, "legitimized" by the international community, is unjust and senseless, as it was, the war, as an armed territorial-expansionist attack internationally recognized country, although late and with incredible difficulty. Practically, that means that, with that interruption, war tasks, ideologies, and contractors of the war remained unfinished. Framed by the Frame of proven joint criminal enterprise and their effects, B&H is living the agony of real politics. All that remains is the "art" of getting used to the new state, persistence in "accepting the truth" about what we would. The policy of Bosnian Serbs and Croats patronized by Serbia and Croatia brings B&H with the strategic intention of the status of a dysfunctional state, impossible to live in diversity.

Bosniaks, whose total number according to the 2013 census exceeds 51% of the population, and bearing in mind that the absolute majority of Bosniaks are Muslim religious affiliations, the comparison of the civic state with the "Islamic state," quoted by some Croat and Serbian politicians, certainly adds to the complex interethnic problem a taste of a cultural conflict of type, the reality of civilization. In fact, in this perspective, the critique of one seemingly essentialist, universalist option, such as liberal democracy, is obscured because of the perspective that questions the essentialist. Bosnian Croats and Serbs have a secondary country, and the Bosniaks dominant ethnopolitics has started similarly with their attachment to Ottoman Turkey. At the same time, a necessary component of nationalist discourse was the idea of a Greater Homeland, followed by the creation of pure homogeneous entities under the model of "one nation-ethnicity, unique language, one religion." Thus, Bosnian Croats and Serbs view a Bosnian state as conceptual to Bosniak nationalism. However, B&H has never been a mono-ethnic and mono-religious country and has multiculturally peacefully existed for centuries.

National identities have their history, and it is wrong to think that the end of the history of the national formation of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes came before the unification of 1918. After all, no nation-state is homogeneous as it seems at first glance and as national ideologues usually claim. Predominantly to be expressed before states have the opportunity to influence national homogenization. The differences between Serbs and Croats in 1918 are not more significant than the differences between the inhabitants of Piedmont and Sicily. It appeared a few decades earlier, between the Bavarians and the Hanoverians, at the creation of Italy and Germany. Either between the Bavarians and the Hanoverians, a few decades earlier, at the creation of Italy and Germany.

Furthermore, Europeans strive for all ethnic groups to be protected by law to exercise their civil and human rights. That is why the sanctity of the democratic order is the rule of law and respect for the citizens' will. Identity can have several layers, and these are not identities that are opposed to each other. The modern history of Europe is mainly the history of just such state-building processes that combine both approaches. It simply declares that all state citizens are part of that nation-state, regardless of their cultural identity. Furthermore, the irony of historicizing the religious-racist view of B&H is that the medieval Bosnian state gave refuge to many of those who fled religious persecution in the West, and it also turns out that by the early-modern era, there were fewer wars in the Balkans than in Europe. Furthermore, the obstacle to mutual trust in the region is the war legacy of the 1990s and the different interpretations of these events in Serbia, Croatia, B&H, and Kosovo. It is a challenge contributing to the creation of a sustainable trust. In the Balkans, external actors are still managing to increase mistrust and rising tensions. Moreover, the role of the established power has a long historical role in the Western Balkans.

4. SOCIAL CAPITAL

Social capital, both private and public good, includes those features of social organization such as (mutual) trust, norms, and horizontally structured social networking, which facilitates the coordinated action of individuals through the formation of more extended social contracts and thus involves the efficiency of social action. Related conflicts need to be publicly articulated and resolved within civil society, which exists under the contextual conditions of liberal democracy: Today, society, religion, and culture are pluralistic in their form. There is no ordinary life outside the public arena. The only thing we can share is the republic, the business of governing. Only when we share this are we fellow citizens. Positively, social capital between different social groups enables the peaceful resolution of social conflicts of interest. There is a high measure of mutual trust, so this acts as informal protection of collective and individual rights outside the boundaries of social groups. In this variant, social capital is supported by formal and informal rules and procedures of democracy. Here, a social resource of political participation of different social groups is formed. Connecting social capital holds together people with similar characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, social class, and bridging connects people who are not alike.

Robert Putnam argued "that both types can have positive societal effects. However, he adds that he believes that bridging social capital is more critical for the functioning of modern societies. One of the biggest challenges facing modern societies is the growing level of diversity. Putnam also argued that the most crucial difference is between bridging and connecting social capital. He notes that seen from the perspective of the public good, the external effects of the linker are primarily adverse because it homogenizes members of a particular group but very often causes antagonism towards those who are not its members" (Häuberer, 2011). On the other hand, bridging is mostly positive because it creates trust among members of different groups.

Diversity is manifested in several dimensions such as class, ethnicity, race, gender, language, culture. Which of these social divisions will be most important depends, of course, on the situation in a particular society. However, nationality and religion are the characteristics that produce the most significant and most profound divisions in modern societies. If we consider only these two characteristics - nationality and religion - we could say that all modern societies are plural and heterogeneous. It would not be easy to find a single society that includes only one religion or nationality. The plurality of modern societies is commonplace in political science insights. However, from this category of plurality, societies can be singled out that political scientists label as thoroughly divided societies. Deeply divided societies are marked by deep divisions that separate ethnic, religious, or cultural communities of interest, value, and identity.

The existence of pluralism in profoundly divided societies leads us to question the impact of diversity on the stability of democracy in these societies. Is such diversity a resource for the further development of these societies? Scott Page advocates such a thesis in his book *The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools and Societies*, in which he argues that "in the long run, the existence of diversity in society encourages citizens' creativity. On the other hand, some theses claim that diversity, profound divisions negatively affect the overall development of society" (Page, 2007). Social capital, both private and public good, includes those characteristics of social organization such as (mutual) trust, norms, and horizontally structured social networking, which facilitates the coordinated action of individuals through the formation of longer-lasting social contracts and thus involves the efficiency of social action. Thus, it directly relates to economic and political development.

Observed in the historical-axiological plane, "the notion of civil society absorbs at most minuscule two morals: - the morality of the industrial and the morality of the post-industrial phase of its citizenship" (Rajkovic, 2017). A series of cultural transformations have accompanied this second post-industrial model of civil society to strengthen the spectrum of post-materialist values. It means that an increasing number of citizens are shifting the primacy of the material moment in the direction of a higher quality of life. As an expression of the personal determinations of the individual, various types of newly acquired freedoms become recognized social values. The society itself is structured as a series of variously connected associations of citizens. By the strength of their commitment, these associations grow into solid associates of the government and state institutions.

The demand for dignity and resentment policies points precisely to this problem in political communities. "The parties of the left have lost to nationalists precisely among those poor or working-class voters who should be their strongest supporters" (Fukuyama, 2018). The European working class did not fall under the banner of the Socialist International in 1914 with the beginning of the First World War, but with its national leaders. "The message of the awakening was intended for the classes. It was delivered to nations by a terrible postal error" (Gellner, 2009). A similar process, Fukuyama believes, happened to the Arab Spring. A letter addressed to classes, delivered to religion (Fukuyama, 2018). Political unrest and struggles for ethnically and religiously pure Balkan communities sparked the reactionary ideological rhetoric in the 1990s. It had the function of preserving the exclusivity and purity of ethnic identity and "returning to the roots," to which normative significance has been assigned, emphasizing the primacy of collectivism over individualism and pluralism. „The basis of such a collectivist pattern is the identification of cultural-ethnic and institutional-political identity, in which the political community fully identifies with the national or ethnic community” (Hadžić, 2020).

The nature of social change in advanced developed societies has prompted the re-actualization and even redefinition of the concept of civil society. There are multiple reasons for the problematization of civil pluralism and the relationship between civil society and the state. Within them, away is sought for the further development of the sphere of civil society and adaptation to new social conditions, primarily through the preservation and strengthening of civic initiative and the expansion of the space of civic and political participation. Existing segmented divisions of an ethnic nature can be intensified through civil society activities. Any subordination of civil society to the political-administrative complex thus falls away, and

mutual relations take the form of an interactive functional and structural assembly. The level of social consciousness limits that no government can cross without falling into the authoritarian rule domain, challenging revolutionary engagement to create a society that implies democratic justice. The confident prospect of the B&H and the Balkans depends on the region's actors, not geopolitically - externally. The organization that can influence disadvantageous processes is the European Union (EU).

5. CONCLUSION

Within the Dayton Peace Accords political system, ethnoreligious framework proves to be more consequential than plural civic space and social capital. The building of religious and national identity is most suitable if we respect and acknowledge the identities of others. Recognition and respect for the other is a precondition for peace and living in peace, not only in B&H but also globally. The prejudice that the majority should rule over the minority is a destructive paradigm of the existing unitedly. In a democratic and liberal environment, no one should rule over anyone, but legalism and laws, which the state should enforce and thus guarantee peace and critical human security to all citizens and peoples.

The ethnoreligious constituency of the people denies the sovereignty of the state and suppresses social development and equality. The ethnopolitical interpretation is reduced to a struggle over ethnoreligious territorialization. The historical-ideologically shape of nationalities associates metaphysics to non-Bosnian territories and imposes people's awareness of external homelands. In the current atmosphere of disunity at various levels of B&H society, including the political issue of affiliation, it does not seem possible to unify the Bosnian nation socio-politically. B&H's "current hybrid war and destructive peace" dominion tends to become a platform for eventual conflicts, genocidal extermination, geopolitical aspirations, and xenophobia. The nation-state is the exclusively political option of the contemporary age. Nationalism has proven to be an adverse ideology, leading to destruction, wars, and discrimination in Balkan countries and globally. Nevertheless, not every national project is malignant. Civic nationalism confronts the nation's ethnic-religious model generated on ethnicity, race, and religion.

In order to understand the past, build a shared future, and form the decisive social capital, civic, democratic awareness, developing a better quality of life, it is crucial to decrease the behavioral practices of division promoted by dominant ethnopolitical antagonistic rhetorics. The European Union (EU) has an integration mechanism and the opportunity to set an example of how EU countries have dealt with their heritage, not always confidently.

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